I agree 100% with Judge Posner regarding Bush's comments about the middle east. He did not have economic liberty in mind. In fact, many repressive middle east nations, for instance Saudia Arabia and Iran, are rich because of their oil. While it would be nice if these countries had well-functioning economies, they simply do not need them, as long as the world values "black gold" so much.

Bush's point was that politics in the middle east is broken and needs to be fixed. Many middle eastern countries are run by corrupt regimes that preach hatred (particularly of America and Israel) to distract their populations from the corruption at home. This hatred breeds terrorists -- the type who wrought 9/11 and the Madrid train bombings. So the safety of the western world, to some extent, depends upon fixing middle east politics. Democracy would, theoretically, force politicians in those countries to debate the real issues rather than using radical Islam and hatred as a 21st century version of "bread and circuses." At least that's the theory, and it seems like a decent one.

History also supports Judge Posner's view that democracy is aided by the emergence of a middle class, which is likely to clamor for broad political rights. The interesting question is how democracy can (and should) interact with economic "liberty" in third-world countries where a small elite own the vast majority of the resources. Democracy in such countries will inevitably lead to calls for land reform and massive redistribution. That might not be a bad thing, if it remedies historic injustices and helps create a middle class. However, it should not be taken too far: nationalizing industries and creating a centrally-planned socialist state have not worked in the countries that have tried it. Perhaps modern-day Brazil displays a better compromise of egalitarian and market principles. It is interesting that Latin American democracies today are largely controlled by left-leaning parties that have embraced the market but remain wary of too much inequality, in light of their countries' history.

"When we speak of the desirability of “democratic” government, what we should mean by democracy is not popular rule in some literal sense"

I assume you are using the royal "we"?

When I speak of democracy, I mean populist rule,
with fragmentation into small communities as a check on majoritarian tyranny. As demonstrated by the anarcho-syndicalists in Barcelona in 1936. (Or in Russia briefly in 1917.)

Sin partido revolucionario de la clase trabajadora, no es posible la victoria de la revolución socialista.

You give no justification for your preferencing of "growth" over "equality". I shouldn't have to point out that it is possible for economic growth to be located entirely within the pocketbook of one or more tyrants. Those few raise the "average" wealth while everyone else perceives price inflation.

Hayek in his rule of law analysis concluded that all regulation should aspire to be prospective and general/equal in application. However, no law will ever be equal in effect so long as large disparities in market power exist. From this we could conclude that wealth equality increases administrability of the rule of law. Leading to a presumption in favor of laws which affect a redistribution of wealth towards equality. (i.e. down the class ladder) Or, alternatively, a presumption in favor of occasional popular revolution to overcome the property rights against equality which tend to concentrate economic growth in the hands of people with property.

Corey's communism demonstrates quite well the tension between democracy (people voting on policies and leaders) and economic freedom (where there is tremendous growth because inequality is allowed).

This has always been the trouble of an otherwise free people who don't believe in property rights. Once the majority recognizes it can vote other people's money for itself, growth will slow down or even reverse. If they go far enough, and extinguish capitalism entirely, there will be serious widespread poverty.

But the right to make as much money as your talents allow will then still be in tension with the greed of the masses who wish to share in wealth they didn't create. It is up to politicians to make the uneasy balance of keeping growth my encouraging private property rights, and appeasing the people who, though they partake in societies wealth by necessity, would still like greater amounts.

Posted at http://www.lostliberties.blogspot.com.

I think there are two reasons democratic countries are less likely to engage in violence and less likely to support those who do.

Posner writes:

The reason is that most people in any society have no taste for the risks and violence of war. Democracies may find themselves involved in defensive wars, of course, but there are very few examples of democratic societies warring with each other; that is, democracies are rarely aggressors (rarely, not never).

It is debatable how agressive our foreign policy is on an absolute scale. But I strongly agree with the idea that societies (judging from aggregate individual preferences, not leader preferences) have significant distaste for war. It's important to realize that this is best expressed under liberal democracies, where information flows freely and individuals choose among competing leaders. Current situations in Iraq and Palestine seem to point in this direction. When fear of reprisal for expressing opposition to violence subsides, the anti-violence movement grows. This is compounded when leaders who take aggressive stances are subject to regular popular control.

It is important to recognize how the current administration, during the prelude to troop movements to Iraq, did its best to attack those who spoke against the war. But those attacks were verbal, political, and non-violent. Furthermore, Bush had to face re-election in 2004. With free flowing information, it becomes harder to force an undesirable war onto a population.

This is not an endorsement of the war. In fact, I strongly opposed military action in Iraq. But it is important to understand the mechanisms that promote and oppose communal violence.

These two factors, free information and representative government, also have the effect of making foreign policy more public; for long term French support, President Bush has to not only convince the French government, but also the French people. I'm guessing that international support weakens domestic opposition, but I'm not quite sure where exactly that fits in here, although I have a hunch it deserves more thought.

I think Posner is somewhat misrepresenting how Bush used "freedom" and "liberty" in his inaugural address.

Bush used the words "freedom" and "liberty" in a spiritual, idealistic, transcendant inaugural address. Thus it is more likely Bush was referring to political freedom and political liberties when he spoke of democracy, not economic liberties and economic freedom. While Bush is a ardent supporter of free trade, open markets, individual economic choice, and radical economic reform of federal entitlements, Bush did not use such rhetoric or nomenclature in his discussion of freedom and liberty spreading throughout the world. If implicit in Bush's remarks is the notion that America is safer with democratic countries populating the world, then Bush should have called for more economic freedom and economic liberty to spread throughout the world, not more political liberty and political freedom. It is economic freedom and economic liberty which leads to the formation of democracies, not rigged elections or ghost-written constitutions.

However, I would note that Bush chastised Putin for Russia's disdain of competition in the oil industry, proposed global economic sanctions on Iran, and has chided China for its closed markets. Bush has called on these nations to expand their economic freedoms and liberties rather than challenging the human rights records, or political freedoms and liberties, of these countries. He has also done the same in his position against Venezuela's Chavez and his position in favor of Colombia's Uribe.

While Posner is correct that Bush generally calls for the global expansion of economic liberties, Bush did not seem to be doing so in his inaugural address, where he was advocating the spread of political liberties, which does not reliably result in democracies, but sounds more grandiloquent.

Bush tackled economic freedoms in his State of the Union address, which came soon after, and was billed as being less idealistic and more grounded in numbers and facts.

Let's look at this a little differently. What is the fundamental dynamic at work here?

The nation is a collection of individuals. If each individual seeks to maximize his/her well-being starting from a basic level of little economic and political wealth, what will be their srtategy? We can use a model such a Maslow's hierarchy: safety and security up to self-actualization.

If the country is stable (not for example France going through its revolution), then the priority of effort should be directed towards maximizing economic goods. If all individuals pursue the same strategy with some success, a point will come when the individuals are competing against each other over resources in interactions sufficiently complex as to require rules. At that point, consensus based rulemaking is necessary.

This is why a large middle class is a force for political liberty in normal circumstances. We don't need to rely on anecdotes or the existence of richer more successful countries as the motivating example. The dynamic is inherent to the growing system. The rules produced must be useful and optimal over a broad basis of the population. The production of the optimal rules requires an information rich exchange (centralized systems fail) with adaptation/feedback. This is democracy in a nutshell.

This model is consistent with Becker's observations.

"Corey's communism"

It is NOT communism. I am endorsing populism, direct-democracy, anarcho-syndicalism... call it what you want but the label communist is wildly inaccurate. Leninist/Stalinist party nonsense is actually what killed democracy in Barcelona and in St. Petersburg. Check out Orwell's "Homage to Catalonia" sometime. Good book.

When real democracy has broken out over the last 100 years, it has been as a result of a populist revolution. Both the communists and the capitalists hate populism, because those systems depend on the existence of a ruling class/party.

Posner admits in his post that property rights are anti-democratic. People want to assert that we need a little tyranny in order to stimulate economic growth, and the alternative is presented as "widespread poverty". Well I have news, there is widespread poverty in the CURRENT system. The only people that are guaranteed to be poorer in a populist system are the ruling elites that are overthrown to get there.

Protecting property rights as if they are the most high aspect of human liberty (a fundamental tenent of economic libertarianism since the days of Locke) leads to concentration of property rights in the hands of the few, allowing them to assert a counter-majoritarian self-interest. When wealth disparity gets over some threshold, our "representatives" in congress feel secure in attacking those mechanisms the people use to check tyrannical exercise of economic power.

This session of congress is proving my point. Observe the destruction of the consumer aspect of the tort system and the wholesale attack on consumer bankruptcy protection. MBNA has infinitely more property and hence more votes in effect than you.

Continuing ...

So the optimal strategy for the dictator is not necessarily to keep the population poor. He simply has to devise a system that allows for an acceptable degree of perceived increase in wealth that does not require distributed rule-making.

The Chinese attempt to accommodate economic growth using the simple rule, "Don't criticize the government". Now they are also attempting to maintain centralized control of the political structures through a combination of xenophobia and nationalistic pride. Thus the Taiwan Straights escalation and a civilian space program. Meanwhile, they are diligent to keep the less privileged segments of the population isolated in the hinterlands. This situation is transitional.

Meanwhile, North Korea is able to keep its population isolated from outside information.

Both systems will eventually evolve into democracies as neither is stable. However, the evolution of North Korea is more likely to involve abrupt regime change. Any military innitiative of the DPRK will only increase the rate at which the change is accomplished. Since the DPRK has made the mistake of pursuing technology that will force the involvement of 3rd parties, expect this change to occur within a very short time span (five years or less). The country is technologically vulnerable due to its backwardsness (Kim is said to be afraid of Predator drones -- there is no significant air defense). The existence of nuclear weapons in this case invites intervention.

The fundamental dynamic is due to technology in all cases. Technology increases per capita wealth and forces more complex interactions to sustain perceieved growth.

Corey, how much formal economics have you taken in your day? I am sure there are many people who read these comments that are tempted to start at the beginning and haul out marginal analysis and supply and demand graphs to answer these fundamental assertions of yours. These issues are way too basic; otherwise, economics fans that seem to be smitten with this blog like myself cannot really engage on the same playing field that you are discussing from right now.

"The Chinese attempt to accommodate economic growth using the simple rule, 'Don't criticize the government'. Now they are also attempting to maintain centralized control of the political structures through a combination of xenophobia and nationalistic pride. Thus the Taiwan Straights escalation and a civilian space program. Meanwhile, they are diligent to keep the less privileged segments of the population isolated in the hinterlands."

Hmm. Shall we turn the microscope on ourselves for a moment? The Patriot Act. The fear-mongering about WMDs. The manufacturing of a furor in the less affluent areas of the "heartland" over "values," gay marriage, Hollywood, and immigration. Do we share anything with the Chiinese?

Of course, the analogy is unfair. There has been no Tiananmen Square here, and there are elections and free speech. But the point is that all kinds of governments, autocratic and democratic, use fear and demagoguery to stay in power. Generally it is less effective in a democratic nation, but there is no guarantee. Hitler was an elected leader, at least at first.

It will be interesting to see whether capitalism brings political freedom in China. The west really had no choice but engagement; sanctions would have been useless and would have made an enemy of the largest nation on earth. Politically, engagement has yielded stability, and it has also enriched the urban-dwelling Chinese. Whether it will bring democracy is a difficult question. I guess it depends how willing Beijing is to have a massacre here and there to repress democratic uprisings. That is an open question.

Corey.

You write: "When real democracy has broken out over the last 100 years..." Can you be more specific in terms of places, dates, people, and governments so those who aren't quite sure what anarcho-syndicalism is?

You also write: "The only people that are guaranteed to be poorer in a populist system are the ruling elites that are overthrown to get there." I am hesitant to challenge this only because I fear a ten page manifesto response regarding your personal economic beliefs, which I'm guessing have not been exposed to Economics 101. But if you think you can justify that statement, please go for it.

"But the point is that all kinds of governments, autocratic and democratic, use fear and demagoguery to stay in power."

In a democracy the government does not have a monopoly on fear nor does fear necessarily help the governement e.g. Spain.

For example, the writer is apparently afraid of the Patriot Act but not WMDs. That reaction does not favor the government.

As we see here again, the same can be said for demagouguery as the writer aptly illustrates.

Posner's says:
>>>>>>>>>>>
I think the point rather is that democratic societies tend to be less aggressive militarily than authoritarian societies. The reason is that most people in any society have no taste for the risks and violence of war. Democracies may find themselves involved in defensive wars, of course, but there are very few examples of democratic societies warring with each other; that is, democracies are rarely aggressors (rarely, not never).

Um, what? It's true that it's hard to find cases of two democracies going to war with each other -- although that may be because of idiosyncratic reasons of the 20th century (there weren't many democracies in the 19th century or before, and WWII/Cold War fundamentally defined alliances in the 20th century, perhaps idiosyncratically alligning democracies together) combined with some clever coding of "democracy" and "war" (if Democracy X helps sponsor/endorse a coup or armed rebellion in Democracy Y, did Democracy X go to "war" with Democracy Y? If yes, then arguably the USA has "attacked" democracies) But the idea that democracies are never agressors just does not hold up to my understanding of history and the conventional wisdom of even democratic peace theorists (let alone Realists). As far as the argument that people in democracies have no "taste" for war, I'd recomend studying the Spanish-American war.

(and if one wants to count "pre-emptive" or balance-of-power stabilizing wars [e.g. Korea, Vietnam, Iraq I and II] wars as merely "defensive" one wonders how many wars would truly count as aggressive. Tyrants would also generally describe many of their "aggressive" wars as pre-emptive as well.)

Note I'm not saying democracies or aggressive wars are bad (aggressive wars may be neccessary to maintain balance-of-power or promote liberty or whatever), just the assertion that democracies are rarely aggresive (toward non-democracies) is not supported by history.

wml, the point is not that democracies have no taste for war or that democracies rarely go to war against non-democracies. The latter is obviously not true, as witnessed by our actions against out-of-control totalitarian states such as Hirohito's Japan, Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, North Korea, North Vietnam, Iraq twice, Afghanistan, and Panama.

The point is that democracies are less likely to war with each other, because the costs of war to the people are more likely to be internalized by political pressures by the citizenry to make a deal rather than war. In addition, democracies are more likely to temper extreme viewpoints by the power of free speech and the necessity to negotiate in the legislative process, thus lowering the likelihood of absurd political theologies running the airwaves and driving national goals.

I believe that is a justifiable assertion, and one well supported by history and the relative absence of aggression between democratic states.

Who knows what Bush really had in mind? Although he's certainly in favor of both economic and political freedoms on the basis of economic and political principles, my guess is that he had something more moralistic in mind with his call for democracy. The Bush Administration now represents the only (and maybe the last) branch of gov't to put any faith in natural law. They're self-consistent in that sense at least.

Regarding the puzzle as to why dictators would allow greater economic liberalization, another answer is that most dictatorships maintain control more with threats (or propaganda) than with actual power. Economic liberalization starts in those places just beyond the reach of actual control -- it doesn't require gov't at all. Social norms often work as good substitutes for legal norms in such circumstances. So dictators aren't allowing economic liberalization to generate more money for them to buy off powerful groups; they're inadvertently allowing the powerful groups to become too powerful for the dictators to buy them off. I think the alternative explanation might better account for the acceleration toward economic liberalization that you see in these cases.

Corey's post brings up something I've had trouble formulating until, and though I don't take it as far as he does, I understand where he is coming from. (Thanks Corey, I think this is what I've been trying to put into words.)



The core split, I think, between the modern liberals and modern conservatives is on who they view as encroaching upon their freedom to be as they choose to. Conservatives have, for the most part, are entirely focused on the government as limiter of freedom. Liberals, like myself, are also concerned with the government encroachment witness the left's reaction to the Patriot Act.



However, we are also concerned about other individual encroaching on our freedom, specifically large, wealthy corporations and individuals. And, to limit the threat from powerful corporations, we are willing to somewhat increase the power of government. (Break up monopolies, prevent worker, customer or environmental exploitation, ensure basic rights, etc. Some do take this too far, and become downright anti-corporate.)



It doesn't matter if the government is totally open and free if my employer is able to control my life. I still have lost my freedom.

So there is one economics and I can only learn it from formal indoctrination in the great books eh? Well, I did read Das Kapital. (As well as Nicomachean Ethics, Locke, some Hayek, and much of The Economic Analysis of Law.) I nearly had a math minor in undergrad, and I know how to say Bayesian. Can I please be in your little econ. discussion group? I promise not to critique any of your bare assertions of political truth, even if they are based on faulty numerical eugenics.

Yes I am aware that econ. 101 says that property rights lead to economic growth. Posner states above that property rights are anti-majoritarian (which translates to anti-democratic.) Economic growth is not dependent on liberty, in fact the most dramatic instances of economic growth worldwide in the last century occured under fascist regimes. By preferencing anti-democratic property rights over democratic process, you establish a preference for facism. This can only be countered to the extent that the rich are willing to give back some property to social insurance in the interests of keeping the rabble in line. Otherwise, you get oppression and a popular revolution. What about this historical thesis is contrary to the things you learned in econ. 101?

When I start seeing something beyond high-school economics on this board from anyone, I promise to at least research my responses.

"Can you be more specific in terms of places, dates, people, and governments so those who aren't quite sure what anarcho-syndicalism is?"

I gave some, Barcelona in 1936, a good primer is Orwell's first person account in "Homage to Catalonia". Another example is Russia after the Tzar was overthrown but before the Lenin vanguard party took control. There have been many popular revolutions in central and south America that led to direct control by the workers over decisions of production (before the US labeled the movement communist as a pretext to overthrowing it.) I would suggest reading Chomsky for perspective but then people will just trot out the anti-Chomsky propaganda, which is sort of boring.

Wars are primarily a product of interests and opportunities. Whenever a country can achieve objectives of great value through the employment of military force at little risk and little cost, it will almost always employ that force, regardless of the nature of the government. That's why we went to war against Mexico in 1846, that's why Iraq went to war against Kuwait in the late 20th century. Kuwait had resources that would have been of great to Iraq, just like Mexico had resources that would be of great value to us
(as did the American Indian, and it had no means with which defend them). Thus, Kuwait, like Mexico, like the Indian territory, was like an unguarded bank, and nobody, neither democrat nor dictator, can resist an unguarded bank. Although the democrat will feel more compelled to justify his aggression by claiming he is just fulfilling his nation's "manifest destiny.

Let me put it this way: Two nations, both democratic, are just as apt to go to war as two non-democratic countries, if one of those democratic countries possesses something, let's call it California, that would be of enormous value to the other, and the country that possess California is utterly incapable of defending it, so that the more powerful nation through military force can easily seize it without much risk or cost. It's a simple concept and an old one: Wars are products of imbalances of power. That's why Mexico's weakness — and the Indians — encouraged our aggression; that's why Kuwait's weakness encouraged Iraq's; that why the demise of the Soviet Union has encouraged us to behave so recklessly. There's no longer any power capable of balancing our's.

Rather than rendering wars less likely, democracies often make them more so. This is because the party in power is more afraid of losing the next election than it is fighting a war, even a needless one. Vietnam is a case in point.

President Johnson knew that if the non-communist government in South Vietnam collapsed, the Republicans would crucify him as they did Truman for failing to prevent the communization of China. After all, as members of the party of Alger Hiss, Truman and Johnson, like all Democrats, were vulnerable to charge of being soft on communism.

And so despite the fact that none of the conditions were in place that Kennedy considered essential for us to prevail in Vietnam—a viable government to defend, congressional support, international backing—Johnson committed American military power to an area of the world that was irrelevant to our economic and strategic interests. A decision that produced 60,000 American corpses and perhaps 3 or 4 million Asian deaths, as well as hundreds of thousands of maimed Americans, both psychologically and physically. And when it was all over, Saigon was called Ho Chi Minh City.

America, then, lost, but it was not weakened, which it should have been if the war was worth fighting in the first place. But it wasn’t, as our vital interests were never at stake. And so, we fought a war not in defense of our interests, but rather, to prevent the party in opposition from crucifying the party in power.

More generally, John Lewis Gaddis holds the Soviet Union was more responsible than the United States for the Cold War because Moscow, without any political opposition about which to worry, could easily make rationale compromises while Washington, because of its domestic political system, could not, as American presidents always had to avoid any type of compromise, no matter how rational, that the party in opposition could characterize as weak. And with the avoidance of rational compromise, the need always to look tough to avoid partisan assault, can easily lead to unnecessary or extended wars.

Today, the conflict between India and Pakistan, despite all the press focus on Iraq, Iran, and North Korean, is the most serious in the world, as it could easily lead to nuclear war. And yet, neither side is willing to accept a rational compromise. And for good reason! If they did, their political enemies would bury them in the next election—if not before.

Democracies are, as both Madison and Hamilton knew, inflexible beasts, and as such, not to be greatly trusted. And so, if you want peace, forget democracies.

I am a little confused by Corey's tirade against "anti-majoritarian" and "anti-democratic" government. Isn't that the foundation of a liberal democracy--to provide for majority rule which respects individual liberty.

I am sure Corey, for the sake of consistency, would like to return power to the majority to regulate abortion, sodomy, and criminal procedure. I am sure he can agree that we don't need any Constitution--nor any judges interpreting the Constitution--interferring with our wonderful "anarcho-syndicalism."

Palooka --

chiding Corey for inconsistency is not going to work. He is if anything consistent. This attack is like the other (very poor) strawman attacks. Also I think you are going to have a hard time finding a national majority (if that is what you imply) in favor of regulating sodomy at all, especially in a way that doesn't discriminate against homosexuals. Sodomy was defined at common law as all sex that takes place outside of marriage. It is not at all inconsistent for a majoritarian to favor national over local majorities. Not that any of this is topic relevant.

DSC --

Must agree with you on supposed democracy-peace correlation. Although it really ought not need to be said. Surely Posner (or is this Becker?) has read his Thucydides. Democratic Heritage didn't prevent Athens from slaughtering the Megarians (also a Democratic People) for violations of various trade embargos. The Megarian debate, in which the Athenian citizens voted to engage in that slaughter, is an interesting read.

Democracies making war on other Democracies is almost as old as Democracy itself. Which is why I support the divine right of kings.

What is the difference between self-described conservatives and liberals?

On aggregate, they process information differently. Since the way we process information tends to be characteristic throughout our lives, this seems to be a root cause of the red-blue divide.

Here is the result of a study upon which I base my observation.

You may want to take the online test at the link yourself and see where you fall out in the distribution.

Minus this result, I would expect some greater degree of ideological consistency within and between the major political parties along simple divergent principles. That is not what we have now, so the results of the study are explanative of the current political dynamic.

In retrospect, the results are obvious.

"chiding Corey for inconsistency is not going to work. He is if anything consistent. This attack is like the other (very poor) strawman attacks. Also I think you are going to have a hard time finding a national majority (if that is what you imply) in favor of regulating sodomy at all, especially in a way that doesn't discriminate against homosexuals. Sodomy was defined at common law as all sex that takes place outside of marriage. It is not at all inconsistent for a majoritarian to favor national over local majorities. Not that any of this is topic relevant."

It is not a strawman argument. Corey claims to support absolute, totally unfettered democracy. Pointing out he (probably) doesn't is completely relevant. I didn't imply the majority would support or prohibit abortion, sodomy, or changes in criminal procedure. I only suggested (correctly) that Corey's philosophy prohibits anything but a majority from acting on those issues. Not only that but it would seem his extremism prevents even the presence of an American style constitution. Simply shouting "strawman" and "very poor argument" doesn't impress (as you have done before). Explain how anything I have outlined above is a misrepresentation of Corey's beliefs. I know you consider him a fellow traveller, but don't defend him unless you're willing to put in the effort.

"if [nations] were genuinely democrat they would probably find it difficult to rally their people to support a militaristic foreign policy..."

...I agree, the United States is not a genuinely democratic country. Not only that, but U.S. foreign policy does make it more vulnerable to terrorist attacks, following your sentence to its conclusion.

So why are we forcing this ideology everywhere else in the world?

"Who knows what Bush really had in mind?"

Anyone who read or heard his inaugural address!

Must I link the barrage of articles and editorials that flooded the blogosphere calling the inaugural Wilsonian, idealistic, moralistic, and so on? Must I link the White House denials that the inaugural represented a drastic moralistic shift in foreign policy (away from realism)? Bush was OBVIOUSLY making a moral statement; his inauguration even had a light show that projected a giant white cross onto the Presidential seal!

So: Posner DID misinterpret Bush's statements: Bush was talking about political liberty, not economic liberty.

If you took the time to read Becker's post, you'd know that he makes clear the following:

Bush should have focused on economic liberty in his inaugural instead of wasting time discussing political liberty, because economic liberty will lead to actual democracy, while political liberty most likely won't.

Pretending that Bush was talking about economic liberty when he wasn't is just a way of mooting your opponent's arguments without actually addressing them. It's the apex of intellectual laziness.

Palooka --

You are right -- I didn't make much effort. Sorry about that. Here goes: I don't think I've ever read Corey argue that a country must sport a U.S. style Constitution in order to satisfy whatever it is he wants in a government. He seems to take the position that Madisonian democracy serves to concentrate wealth into the hands of a few elite individuals. He supports majoritarian rule, but would probably argue that we don't really have that in any regard.

This argument may be open to attack, sure, but not for any lack of consistency. It is a coherent position; it is not self-contradictory. I called your attack a "straw-man" attack, because you created a set of values opposed to those which he has argued for, and then stated that he probably holds both of sets. There isn't any special reason to think that. It's a little bit lazy to argue about what you think his positions might be, as opposed to those positions which he has espoused quite clearly.

R, let's examine what Corey has actually said (as opposed to what you hope he's trying to say):

I am endorsing populism, direct-democracy, anarcho-syndicalism..

When real democracy has broken out over the last 100 years, it has been as a result of a populist revolution. Both the communists and the capitalists hate populism, because those systems depend on the existence of a ruling class/party.

When I speak of democracy, I mean populist rule,
with fragmentation into small communities as a check on majoritarian tyranny.

----

The only limitation on democracy Corey has proposed in his comments in this thread are, interestingly enough, a sort of federalism (which seems to nullify your unrelated point made earlier that Corey wouldn't have a problem with a national majority overruling a local majority, as it now appears he would).

My question is--does he really believe in absolute democracy? The probable answer is no. His problem with "anti-majoritarian" protections for economic liberty isn't because he's an absolute populist or democrat, which is precisley my point in bringing up anti-majoritarian protections he probably supports. I agree his position is coherent, but only if he repudiates "anti-majoritarian" realities of the current system which he almost certainly supports. That is my point in placing these questions to him. Let us see if he is consistent! Is he willing to place abortion, regulation of sexual relations, free speech, establishment of religion all on the altar of democracy! I think we know the answer to that question. I think we all know Corey isn't the radical democrat he's pretending to be.

Wow, lots of talking about me...

You've hit on the number one argument against direct democracy, in fact, nearly all arguments against direct democracy are some form of "The people will do horrible things!" I do not agree that this is true.

You are also correct to point out that were I alive in 1787, I would have been an anti-federalist. I do not apply this label to myself generally because of the pro-slavery, social conservative slant of nearly everyone who traditionally supported it. I think Scalia and Rehnquist are boorish and hateful.

The answer to your question is, yes, I am prepared to sacrifice any and all issues to the altar of democratic rule. This is not to say that I would support an instantaneous delegation of all legislative power to the current social majority. I believe there are pre-requisites to effective populism.

1) People must be more involved in political thought than the masses are today. Democracy does not work for anyone without a forum for real discourse.

2) Our society must be rendered less violent. Direct Democracy does not work when everyone has a gun.

Jurgen Habermas' work in the discourse ethics field (reformulating Kant to apply categorical imperatives by universal consent) is interesting and relevant to this.

It may be true that there is not a democratic majority that I could join on the social issues you mention. It is also true that a majority of the population is NOT involved in the debate beyond passive self-identification with their favorite pundit. It is not clear to me that people would be against gay marriage rights if they had to defend their position (in good faith) in a forum which included homosexuals.

But I think it is unfair to ask "would a direct democracy be perfect in its delineation and enforcement of fundamental rights." The appropriate question is, would it be better than the increasingly unrepresentative republic we are living under now?

One practical limit on direct democracy is that people will naturally specialize in areas where they are interested or talented. There is no reason to require 300 million people to agree on the color of the new town bank building. There is reason to want as many inputs as possible on issues like infrastructure maintenance. This sort of thing is at least technologically possible now with developments in computer technology.

Anyone interested in rebutting DSC, go to Michael Brandon McClellan's blog. I have an ongoing debate with the good Professor there and have no desire to repeat myself (which he did, verbatim).

"The answer to your question is, yes, I am prepared to sacrifice any and all issues to the altar of democratic rule."

Then let it be. I'm not so sure you'd like the results, however. Establishment of religion, regulation of abortion and sexual relations, no gay marriage, no more Ward Churchills in the academy, juvenile death penalty reinstated, no welfare for illegals, etc.

The people you claim to represent are decidedly to the right of the law as determined by our judicial elite on almost every issue. I'm not so sure that excludes the question of property rights, either. Your populist radicalism is a certain path to marginalize some of your most treasured political beliefs--beliefs which are only sustained because of the anti-democratic character of our government.

Palooka -

To be fair, Corey qualified his argument with Free Speech. Some, not all, of the examples would diminish the effect of majority rule. Second, while some losses to the "Democratic" cause would be felt by pure democracy, they would not result in absolutes. Abortion may be regulated, but not to the extent that some states desire (complete prohibition). There may be no gay marriage, but there also may be civil unions (another policy which some states reject today). Both sides would take a loss for compromise.

You shouldn't infer anything about my beliefs on those policy issues, btw. If you are wondering, though, I think where the Constitution is silent, those matters should be left to the people's representatives. Sometimes I don't like the results and sometimes I do, but I think the legislature is a more legitimate and effective govering body than the judiciary, and unless our legal traditions or the Constitution implicate something different, that is where power should remain.

I'm willing to take your statements at face value, but I will once again express my shock at your willingness to relinquish the most substantive power the progressive idealogy possesses--influence over national policy via the judiciary.

Your preoccupation with democracy would be more appropriate if we were leaving in the Lochner Era. But we're not. I am not sure why you would think a democratic solution would be any kinder to your radical eqalitarianism than the current system.

leaving=living****

"To be fair, Corey qualified his argument with Free Speech."

If he made such an exception for free speech, then I missed it. But making such an exception demonstrates the obvious--Corey is anti-majoritarian, anti-democratic when it aligns with his beliefs about what is good. And how is that any different than what he is criticizing Posner for?

"Abortion may be regulated, but not to the extent that some states desire (complete prohibition). There may be no gay marriage, but there also may be civil unions (another policy which some states reject today). Both sides would take a loss for compromise."

Thank you. It's nice to see liberals making cogent arguments FOR democracy and against the imperial judiciary. Though I suspect it is fleeting, once you realize democracy isn't good for "the cause." Give the people what's good for them, even if they don't want it!

"willingness to relinquish the most substantive power the progressive idealogy possesses--influence over national policy via the judiciary."

Why be shocked, if I endorsed that power, you would correctly accuse me of paternalism and inconsistency.

We both agree that the legislature is the "best" branch, but if its democratic nature is the reason, why depend on the process of representation at all vs. direct voting? The only possible answer is that one wishes to give the representatives the power to vote against popular will, that is, to be undemocratic when necessary to "save us from ourselves."

If congress does nothing but collect and vote the will of the people, then it could be replaced by a machine. Of course we know that is not all they do. Representation can be just as paternalistic as the exercise of judicial power.

The People are the most likely to behave in a radically egalitarian way because they have the least individual power. Singular people will always attempt to gain comparative advantages over each other, but absent the ability to assert rights as to the rest of the world based on collections of property, the only lasting way to concentrate power in an effectively populist system is by agreeing with each other.

The problem with utopian systems like "anarcho-syndicalists" is they are static systems that suffer from inadequate methodologies to manage change. Communism, libertarianism, anarcho-syndicalists etc are fine on paper; who wouldn't want to live in a perfect society.

But communism, for example, failed for two reasons. First, because it fundamentally misunderstood greed. To Marx, the problem was the greed of the bourgeoisie. But he, and everyone who followed (or at least believed - many who followed Marx were political opportunists, not believers) fantasized that the proletariat would somehow be free from greed. They must be, right? They were the 'have nots'. Had they been greedy, they would have become the 'haves', no? That is why in every attempt to implement communism, the dictatorship of the proletariat comes up short in its anticipated altrusim.

Second, in portraying communism as the apex of political evolution, Marx saw no need to consider how communism would evolve, how it would handle change. The world doesn't stop spinning, population doesn't stop growing, just because someone prints up a manifesto.

Corey's notion of his kind of democracy sounds like a great place. Small communities doing as they please, uniting in times of trouble for mutual defense, otherwise leaving well enough alone. Unfortunately, a horse can only run an effective race with blinders on.

First, these independent communities need to be close enough to make mutual defense viable. But get too close, and internal friction between the communities for scarce resources will bring the communities at war with each other.

Second, every generation or so, the communities will need to relocate, readjust, or as we said in the military, Dress, Right! And I don't believe Corey wants a militaristic society, like the Spartans. Assuming these utopian communities are successful, and assuming we don't have some forced planned parenthood program like the Chinese, the communities are going to grow, requiring more space. No problem. Put everything on wheels; vast fields of trailer parks!

Third, the threats to the system will come from without and within. Unless we start fantasizing that this system of small villages is globalized, there will be a need for mutual defense. Now unless we locate this system deep in the Swiss Alps, where there are natural fortifications, this country will be hard pressed to prevent better organized (but obviously less noble!) countries from rolling over them.

But even in a globalized setting, we are ignoring greed, aren't we? One community gets jealous because a neighboring village prospers from some natural economic advantage, say a river just ripe for hydroelectric power. So this disgruntled village, angry that Corey's village won't share such obviously communal property, stirs up bad feelings with Corey's other disadvantaged neighbors and this alliance calls forth the mutual defense agreement and they attack Corey's village. The long and short of it, we get a bloody war that ends when this plebeian populist system evolves into an oligarchy of a few powerful cities. It happens all the time.

Fourth, Corey's vision of democracy only localizes the problems. How does democracy work WITHIN the confines of the community? Does Corey envision this anarcho-syndicalist democracy continue down to the elemental level where each person is separated from the rest of their civilization to the extent that they come together only in times of need, sort of a Gordon R. Dickson "Dorsai!"? So where are the collective efforts? And how are they managed?

I'm sorry, but utopian fantasies may be heaven or hell, but it has no place on earth. Besides, it is interesting to note that the few examples Corey provides never survived more than a few years.

Can someone tell me how to get paragraphs without double spacing? I use the HTML P for paragraphs, like on other sites, but this site is double spacing my paragraphs (when I leave them out and attempt to let the Enter key break my paragraphs, I get no paragraphs)

hmmm let's try something

Ah! Enter key is not ignored, if the HTML P is there, only when it isn't.

never mind

One of the advantages of decentralizing constitutional restrictions and putting those debates at the state constitutional level is that it allows localized control over the optimal level of minority rights protections. Jurisdictions compete for citizens and businesses to produce the optimal level of such rights.

In the US, democracy has resulted in many states having much stronger property rights protections at the state constitutional level than at the federal level. So, this idea that the people would want fewer property rights protections is not born out by the evidence. In the long run, it produces much greater opportunities for rich and poor alike, as well as much greater opportunities for social mobility through hard work.

Another advantage of decentralizing the debate on property rights is that it allows localities to define for themselves what constitutes property and where the lines should be drawn for the definition of property. Different economic conditions and cultural/religious beliefs call for different approaches to what private property is.

One drawback to this approach is if the state (or federal) judiciary is chronically biased. 100 years ago, the judiciary tended to be biased towards property/economic liberty (Lochner era). These days, the money that flows to the lawyer class through inefficiently high regulations and laws often biases state court systems against the will of the people in codifying property rights.

I'm in a bit of a quandry and have a concern regarding these woderful terms; "Economic Freedom", "Economic Liberty", "Political Liberty", "Political Freedom" that seem to be tossed about like so many tennis balls. That concern is, what do we actually mean? What do they truly entail? This concern is definitional in nature, both in its connotational and denotational senses. Being that as it may, I will return to this concern temporarily.

As for Judge Posner's historical analysis of the relationship between political systems and economic systems; I'm in general and principal agreement. What I'm not in agreement with, is the idea that liberalization of an economic system gives rise to greater democratic tendencies. On closer inspection, I think we will find that a liberalized approach to the economic functioning will give rise more often than not, to the development of Aristocracies, Meritocracies, Plutocracies and the like. Not Democracies.

So, returning to my original quandry, when we speak of Freedom and Liberty, we need to ask ourselves, Freedom/Liberty from whom? and Liberty/Freedom to whom? These questions are just a variation on the basic questions of "Freedom From" and "Freedom to" This will help us set up an actual and coherent definiton and understanding of Liberty and Freedom be it economic or political.

Has anyone proposed that Palooka and Corey get their own blog where they can debate each other ad nauseam without even trying to attempt to stay within the boundaries of the topic?

To follow up on Hatfield's comment, the term "economic liberty" should mean a lot more than just judicial enforcement of contracts and of property rights. It is interesting that those are the two things on which Judge Posner seems to concentrate. A society could strictly enforce the "contract" and "property" rights of slaveholders and be far from free.

Economic liberty, to me, implies the ability of each individual to participate meaningfully in the market economy. Thus, economic liberty presupposes a certain amount of personal liberty (for instance, no slavery or servitude). It also presupposes the educational opportunity necessary to participate in the market, anti-discrimination principles, and fair labor standards. If capitalism leads to a society of sweatshops and sharecroppers, the people are hardly free. They are enslaved, by contract and pre-existing property ownership, to the oligarchs and plutocrats.

Not to defend Putin, but I think that was his point in rebuffing Bush during their recent meeting. Nearly everyone these days believes in the market and wants it to succeed. But if a handful of corrupt individuals are controlling the market, the populace is not truly free. This is one problem, of many, in Russia today.

That seems about right.

"Has anyone proposed that Palooka and Corey get their own blog where they can debate each other ad nauseam without even trying to attempt to stay within the boundaries of the topic?"

I propose that your allegation that I was off topic is:

1) itself off-topic, and

2) inaccurate (given that I was talking about the relation between democracy and property rights, which happens to be the title of Posner's post.)

I apologise if I am blocking your access to the Temple of Posner, what was it that you were hoping to say?

One sentence in Posner's original post, "The reason is that most people in any society have no taste for the risks and violence of war," seems to be the one deserving the most critical examination.

If this is true, spreading democracy can be construed as a national security issue: it is in our self interest. If not, the claim that the US actions in foreign nations are purely for economic profit (blood-for-oil argumentation) gain significant credibility.

Vinay -

The idea you suggest appears similar to that posed by Chis Wonnell on the Right Coast Blog. Commenting on Bush's speech:

"On the other hand, there's a tension, almost a contradiction, in the Bush message. He says, quite rightly, that democratic countries, being accountable to ordinary citizens, tend to be more peaceful. But this applies to the United States as well as to the countries we might want to democratize. A democratic America won't be enthusiastic for endless humanitarian military interventions, so the risk is that we will soon vote in a real dove who will put an emphatic end to such adventurism. The predictable result of such a course would be more aggression by the wicked."

Sorry about that:

Right Coast Blog

http://therightcoast.blogspot.com/2005_01_01_therightcoast_archive.html

I dispute the notion that democracies are less likely to indulge in war.

Consider the 200 years prior to World War-II. Britain was the pre-eminent democracy in the world for most of that time (only losing its position to the United States at the very end). In that period, Britian fought more wars than just about any other country. Only the Napoleonic wars and WW-II can be said to be forced on Britain. [ Some would put WW-I in that category, but not me]. The war of 1812, the Crimean War, the Boer war, a dozen-plus wars in India, wars in Afghanistan and Nepal, wars in modern day Zimbabwe, in Sudan, in the Middle East, in the far-East, in China etc.

Even after WW-II, it took violence to get Britain to leave some of its colonies. Not India, although if Churchill had been in power, it would have required violence. But in Kenya, Malaysia, probably even in Palestine (there are those who claim Britain would not have given up the league of nations mandate without pressure from the Irgun].

In this period, Britain had a fairly representative army. The aristocrats fought and did as officers, the regular folk as soldiers. It seems clear here that a set of philosophies (imperialist expansion, maintaining the balance of power) drove a large war force.

Similarly, in US history, there are only a few clear cut cases of the US going to war just because of a foreign attack (Revolutionary war, Barbary Pirates, WW-II, Afghanistan). I do not think WW-1 belongs in this category, although the war of 1812 may. Many of the wars of thje 19th/early 20th century are particularly notable as not being defensive wars: the wars with the Indian tribes (some may be retaliation, but they were accompanied by US expansion into tribe territory), Mexican war, Spainish American war, gunboat diplomacy in China. You can defend Korea and Gulf War-I as defensive wars, it is less plausible to defend Vietnam as a purely defensive war since it rested on a theory (domino effect that did not seem to hold). And it would be extremely hard to claim that military interventions in Grenada, Haiti, Lebanon, Panama, Bosnia, Kosovo and Gulf War-II were defensive. Understand that there may have been reasons (foreign policy driven, danger to Americans in that country, humanitarian reaspons) for each war, but the defensive claim is really hard to justify unless you use a degenerate case ("well, you know, X's actions cause instability in part Y, or X could threaten us in the future).

There are also wars by proxy. Most European powers, including Great Britain indulged in them during the colonial period and the US and the Soviet Union did so during the Cold War period.

Also noteworthy were the warlike tensions between India and Pakistan when both countries were democracies, leading to the nuclear arms race that resulted in the spread of nuclear technology to Libya and Iran. Apparently, the United States today believes that an autocratic Pakistan is more stable and trustworthy than the democratic one was.

Would it be more accurate to say that democracies, in general, do not engage in war for the "wrong" reasons -- that is, megalomania or a thirst for conquest? The recent U.S. military actions in Kosovo, Panama, and Gulf Wars I and II, while not "defensive" in that there was no real threat to U.S. security, were intended to oust corrupt governments or restrain murderous regimes. While there were good arguments on both sides regarding whether these wars were proper uses of American military power, they were not "unjust" in the larger sense.

Would it be more accurate to say that democracies, in general, do not engage in war for the "wrong" reasons -- that is, megalomania or a thirst for conquest?

I don't know if I agree with that. The history of British imperial expansion would certainly seem to be at odds with that idea. It wasn't precise lymegalomania or a thirst for conquest that drove Britain, but it was a philosophy motivated by British mercantilists and a desire to preserve British power. Yes, there were nobler goals, the so-called White Man's burden (a form of megalomania, maybe :-), but they were not the primary motivator. India was first largely conquered by the mercantilists of the East India company, not by Kiplingesque do-gooders. Many other English wars in Europe were fought out of an attempt to preseve the balance of war in Europe (and ensuring that no European power could become powerful enough to challenge Britain).

Similarly, the expansion of the United States into the West, the numerous wars with Indian tribes, the Mexican war etc. do not fit the model of generally "just" wars. The wars were enormously beneficial to the United States, giving it more territories and natural resources and more power, but the fact that expansion benefited a country does not make a war "just" in the sense that Bosnia might have been just. Self-Interest, a philosophy (manifest destiny) were the major motivator.

Many other European democratic countries also indulged in colonial expansion (France, Belgium) and they did a much worse job of building civil societies than the English. Germany, one of the least democratic European powers, had the smallest colonies (largely because they were late to the colonial game). [ Of course, non democratic countries such as Russia, Turkey and Japan participated at this game too]

Recently wars for old-fashioned imperial reasons have fallen a bit out of favor. It may be because they're politically incorrect, but I think the major reason simply is that they cannot be made to pay easily any more. Great Britain is finding itself fiscally and militarily challenged by a set of small to medium deployments and can only just field a small contingent in Iraq, the Falklands, the Balkans and the Afghanistan. The same Great Britain that once held India, Pakistan, Bangladesh as just part if its holdings would he hard-pressed to occupy Bombay these days and did not even consider an attempt to hang on to Hong Kong militarily. In short, modern democracies have a distate for old-style imperial wars simply because they seem to be far more trouble than they're worth.

No, democracies go to war for mostly the same reasons as other types of governments.

David, even admitting for the sake of argument that the two Gulf Wars were in part motivated by humanitarian concerns, and not just sold to the public on those grounds, it is nonetheless true that they were also motivated by strategic concerns, namely, protection and expansion of American interests in the gulf region. How is that different, exactly, from the adventures of the British Empire in the 19th Century?

One can point to any number of examples, but those are only case studies. I think it is notable, however, that I cannot think of a long standing Democracy that has not started a war to expand its own interests abroad.

I think the more cogent point surrounds Posner's argument about citizen-deterrence. The argument goes that, in a democracy, the voters internalize the costs of war and so are more likely to take those costs into account when considering a peaceful settlement with the opposing country. If both countries are democracies: voila, peace.

But in most democracies, voters don't all internalize the costs of war. Unless the war is on a very grand scale, volunteer armies do the job, and they come mostly from the poorer classes. I do not mean to play the happy syndicalist here -- what's important to my argument isn't that they are poor (although the fact that the poor are forced into fighting wars started by those who were rich enough never to have to serve is indeed morally repugnant) but that they are a minority of the population, the soldiers.

If a majority stands to gain monetarily from the war, without having to internalize the costs, you can see a democracy going to war in the same fashion as an oligarchic or monarchic nation. Britain, in the 19th Century, was pretty much a democracy, and we are too. I think people get wrapped up in the WWII, morally distinct type of war example. But if you look through history, it is rare that one side of a conflict can truly claim a moral high ground. Usually both sides fight for their own interests, when they perceive an advantage for doing so.

Democracies are great, and true globalization (though it has its downsides for sure) may reduce the kinds of advantages available to a country who makes war on other countries. But spreading democracy by war does not produce peace. That is a non-sequitor, and ought to be pointed out whenever possible.

erg, you beat me by two minutes.

Many are making many interesting comments about the nature of war and democracy. I think they're missing a point, though. It isn't just that a democracy is less likely to go to war for "evil" reasons. It is that there are few (are there any?) examples of a democracy attacking ANOTHER democracy. As a democracy, then, it would seem natural to secure ourselves by expanding democracy abroad. This does not necesssarily mean that countries with non-democratic systems are safer, indeed they are arguably less safe as democracy expands.

Well the Megarian episode is one such example. I think you will find that where governments see strategic advantages to war, they make war, regardless of the form of government that opposes them. I hate to repeat myself, but if you would read the post above, it outlines a few problems with the "no democracy could make war on another democracy" argument, namely that the average citizen of a democracy doesn't necessarily internalize the costs of war, especially where the democracy in question utilizes a volunteer army comprised mostly of poor people.

There are many probable reasons why we haven't seen wars between democracies. Any population "internalizes" costs of war. Democratic countries, however, usually have free media, so the ability to accurate assess those costs increases. Moreover, those costs are reflected in policy more than in other systems. Even a dictator must be careful not to engage in unpopular wars as it might destabilze his power, but democracies are much more sensitive in this regard. Engaging in an unpopular war will cost a leader an election, and hurt his idealogical and political allies. The positive correlation with individualism, and individual rights, with democracy is perhaps one more reason why democracy's have a distaste for war.

All those decrease the probability a democracy will engage in wars of aggression (or even defense) generally. The reason it is even less likely for a democracy to attack another democracy is the decrease in benefits. As just discussed, democracies may more accurately internalize the costs of war because of free media, and their preferences are taken into account faster and easier than in less democratic systems. This explains a general aversion to war, but not why democracies are especially unlikely to attack other democracies. Because of perceptions of justice and morality, democracies are exceedingly reluctant to attack other democracies, even if material interests are present. Most don't fret over Iraq because the war removed a horrible dictator, freed 25 million from his terrible reign, and has the potential to encourage democratic reforms in a region which desperately needs it. And of course it removed a threat, though that threat seems smaller than once thought. Had Iraq been a democracy, where its people where content with their government, do you really think the American people would be as pleased with the war (threat or no threat)?

All of this together translates into the manifest fact that though democracies wage war, that their decisions are more justifiable than non-democratic systems, and that they are especially unlikely to wage war against other democracies.

Of the costs of the Iraqi war, who is internalizing them? The most striking costs are those bourne by the people who must fight in the Iraqi war; most of them enlisted in the army before the war began for economic reasons. The majority of Americans do not have to worry about fighting in Iraq, or about their children being sent there. That cost is not spread; it is concentrated on a small minority. Because the majority of voters, and an even greater majority of those who donate to political campaigns do not pay this most direct cost of war, it is not sufficiently accounted for in our government's decision making process.

Then there is the monetary cost. We are not paying that either. In fact, the current government has decreased taxes. In the future, we or our children may have to pay for the war with a tax increase, or the costs may be off-set with a reduction in government services. In which case, those who received the government services that we cut will pay for the war. That would be, most likely, poor people.

Do you still argue that democracies necessarily internalize the costs of war more completely, such that they are taken into account when deciding whether or not to engage in one? You can imagine a democracy, with a true citizen army, for which that is true, but can you remain steadfast that it is true for all democracies, as a "manifest fact?"

I don't feel the need to address your argument about justice, as we have previously listed many wars entered into by democracies that were not "just wars." Why do you think that argument should hold up with regard to wars between two democracies, and not when dealing with wars between a democracy and some differently organized country? Ask yourself: is there any particular reason this should be true? Are citizens in a democracy more naturally just? Are they more likley to ignore self interest, if they think it can be had, because their adversary is a democracy?

It is true, citizens would rather beleive their country is fighting on the side of justice. But how hard is it for them to convince themselves of that fact? Reading your post, I think "not very."

The percent of military personnel supporting the Iraq war is greater than the population as a whole, so your argument is not only without merit, it is self-defeating in the particular case at hand.

The question isn't whether or not a democracy is perfect at assessing costs and in having those costs reflected in policy. What system is perfect? The relevant question is whether or not democracies are BETTER at including those costs--both tangible and intangible--in the decision making process. The answer is supported both by theory and evidence--democracies are more reluctant to wage war, especially against other democracies.

"Ask yourself: is there any particular reason this should be true? Are citizens in a democracy more naturally just?"

Nonsense. It isn't that the people in a democracy are any more just, it is that the people have control of the government! That is what democracy is! It matters much less what a population thinks is "just" in an undemocratic country--DUH! Their preferences are not accounted for. Democracy is different.

The fact that military personnel support the war does not at all defeat my argument. Do you argue that because they support the war, they aren't bearing the cost of the war? It is only natural for a standing army to support whatever war it is being shipped off to. For one thing, it is a survival technique. For another, a large portion of military training cosists of preparing individual soldiers to face such challenges with enthusiasm, or if you'd like it put more cynically, to bear these costs without thinking too hard.

As for officers, wars make their careers. Of course they would support one. That fact does nothing for you.

You see, Palooka, when you are making an assertion about a special attribute of democracies, it is up to you to prove that assertion. The argument goes that democracies don't make war on each other because the voters are forced to internalize the costs. I was pointing out the holes in that argument. In the absence of another argument, you are making bare assertions. That isn't new of course.

There is simply no reason to think that democracies are better at internalizing costs of war than other types of governments, to the point that it would affect decision making. See above. That remains true regardless of which words you put in caps lock.

"For another, a large portion of military training cosists of preparing individual soldiers to face such challenges with enthusiasm, or if you'd like it put more cynically, to bear these costs without thinking too hard."

OK, so now you trot out the old "soldiers are too stupid to know what's good for them" line. Your distrust of democracy makes more sense now.

Palooka, I would like for you to read posts at least twice before responding. I am tired of correcting you.

You write: "It isn't that the people in a democracy are any more just, it is that the people have control of the government!"

Very good, Palooka. My point was that if a majority of those citizens don't internalize the costs of a war in question (just or unjust) but do internalize the benefits, they will vote for that war. Regardless of who it is against.

You seem to think that citizens in a democracy would restrain themselves from unjust wars against other democracies, even when they stand to profit from those wars, and won't pay any costs. Why would that be, Palooka, unless they were more naturally just?

Actually I think it makes perfect sense for soldiers to support any war they are fighting in at the time, for the reasons outlined above. I just don't think that's particularly relevant to the discussion.

Also, I don't think I particularly distrust democracy, unless by distrust, you mean that I am willing to talk about it with some clarity.

If you have nothing new to say Palooka, I should probably do some work today.

"You seem to think that citizens in a democracy would restrain themselves from unjust wars against other democracies, even when they stand to profit from those wars, and won't pay any costs. Why would that be, Palooka, unless they were more naturally just?"

Whenever you write something stupid, you think ratcheting up your pretentiousness will obscure it. It doesn't. In fact, you seem to repeat the same flawed argument again. Citizens of democracies are not necesarily more "just," it is that they have the POWER which citizens in other countries do not.

The reason why citizens of a democracy would be even more wary of waging war against other democracies is that it reduces the "morality" or "justice" of the decision. Warring against a dictatorship is not morally equivalent in most people's minds to warring against a democracy. The legitimacy of the adversarial government, then, is relevant to the morality of the action. This implicates absolutely nothing about whether citizens of democracies or dictatorial regimes are "naturally just." It is the system of government which is unjust, not its citizens.

Nothing new to say, I was right, and yet I will respond:

In a representative democracy, yes, individual citizens have POWER. Perhaps I should underline POWER. Or use exclamation points. POWER!!!!. See, that's much more persuasive.

So you would think, as a good Posnerite, they would use that POWER!!!! in favor of their own self-interest, no? And what direction does that self-interest lean towards, if a majority of the individual voters (the ones with the POWER!!!!) don't internalize the costs of a war, but do internalize the benefit? Think hard Palooka. Please.

You are asserting that the individual citizens will be swayed by their morality. You assert that they are only willing to invade non-democratic countries, because doing so is more moral. I will resist the urge to challenge that right now, Palooka. I will simply ask the question: why should individual voters choose morality over self-interest in this setting? Let us imagine a constitutional monarchy where, say, 10% of the population makes the decision to go to war. They won't internalize the costs of this potential war any more than we do ours. You seem not to think that they will be persuaded by moral arguments against invasion. Why should the individual voters be so persuaded, when war is in their self-interest?

I submit your argument about the morality of wars against democratic vs. non-democractic countries as evidence of the willingness of most people to bend moral arguments to suit self interest.

It is that there are few (are there any?) examples of a democracy attacking ANOTHER democracy.

Certainly. Britain vs. America in the Revolutionary war, and the war of 1812. Britain and France fought several proxy wars in the late 19th century in Africa, and the only reason they stopped was not because Britain was suddenly enamored with France's democracy, but that each realized they had a greater enemy in Germany.

During World War-II, Britain violated Norway's neutrality and was only really prevented from invading it because Germany did so first.

Britain suppressed domestic liberation of movements in a number of countries in the 20th century: in some cases (such as Egypt), these were not democratic movements, but in other cases such as India, Ireland, Palestine and (arguably) Kenya, these were democratic movements.

In recent times, India and Pakistan remain the poster children for democracies that have fought each other, even coming close to a nuclear war in 1999. [ While Pakistan has not always been a democracy, it was so during some of the conflics]. Another example that comes to mind is Russia and Chechnya (when independent).

You've changed your argument. You were trying to say that my arguments required that citizens of democracies be more "naturally just" than citizens of other, undemocratic countries. I don't see this argument in your most recent post.

I will address your new, refined argument. I am not sure Posner would agree with my belief there is a moral check on attacking other democracies. My guess is that he believes citizens don't have a taste for long, bloddy wars, and democracy allows that preference to be reflected in policy. I have no dispute with that. As far as less costly, less bloddy wars, I think there is sigifnicant (though not as strong as more self-interested reasons) restraint found in appeals to morality. We see this in the anti-war movement even today. The problem is most don't think the war is immoral, because it removed a mass-murdering tyrant, and has provided the opportunity of democracy and reform. Do you really think Americans would feel the same about the war if that weren't the case?

Again, I am not arguing that it is an impossibility that a democracy would attack another democracy to extract material benefit. That is possible, maybe even inevitable. I am arguing--and I am unsure if you disagree with this or not--that being a democracy makes it less likely. That is all anybody that I have read on this thread is trying to articulate.

Does it make a difference that most of the "unjust" wars started by democracies involved 18th and 19th century Britain, France, and the United States, when only white male landowners could vote? Perhaps universal suffrage is necessary before a democracy becomes peaceful. Or, maybe, a racist, sexist, and overall repressive society is more likely to have a violent foreign policy than an egalitarian society, regardless of its form of government. Any thoughts?

The answer is supported both by theory and evidence--democracies are more reluctant to wage war,

And that is simply not correct. I repeat once again the example of Great Britain, certainly the pre-eminent democracy of the 200 years leading up to the WW-II. In that time, Great Britain fought numerous wars, including probably nearly a hundred in the 19th century. No other country can come close to Britain's war record in the 20th century, and the major motivation was mercantilism or a desire to increase British power.

The United States in the 19th century also fought several wars against Indian tribes, against Mexico etc. and basically warned off from other European countries from intervening in the Americas, which were to be America's sphere of influence.

When a particular expansionist philosophy (Manifest Destiny or british Empire building) greatly benefits a democracy, then it will indulge in wars. Another reason is ancient grudges or hates (such as Kashmir in the India/Pakistan case).

Now in modern times, the costs of wars have increased greatly, both economic and military. Europe, heartland of most democracies , has burnt itself out after centuries of wars. The benefits of territory conquest are far lower and the native generally tend to get far more restless. Imperialist expansion is poliically incorrect. So the motivation for Western democracies to indulge in wars is far smaller.

Yet, that doesn't necessarily hold for all democracies. A hypernationalistic China could be a danger even if democratic. A democratic, yet nationalist India is eager to establish a world role befitting its population size and that could well lead to tensions with othe democracies.

I didn't change the argument, Palooka, I slowed it down. But now we are on the same page with it, more or less.

I disagree with you that citizens are constitutionally more averse to blood than your typical non-democratic rulers. If anything, they probably have more experience. The reason, historically, one would think that citizens don't have a taste for long, bloody wars is that they have to fight them. But the argument depends on the majority of citizens actually having to fight.

Your moral defense of wars against non-democratic countries is rather a jumble. When those wars cause more harm than good, and when they are motivated for material benefit, how can they be called moral? You must concede that at least some wars against non-democratic nations are immoral, maybe even more so than some wars against democracies. Do the dead spring to life because you call a dictator illegitimate?

One of the advantages of decentralizing constitutional restrictions and putting those debates at the state constitutional level is that it allows localized control over the optimal level of minority rights protections.

I'm afraid that just might take us back 150 years...

Jurisdictions compete for citizens and businesses to produce the optimal level of such rights.

To me, that sounds like it defeats the purpose of universal rights...

Different economic conditions and cultural/religious beliefs call for different approaches to what private property is.

To take it to not-quite hyperbole, that would only give the states the power to redefine slavery as property, again...

If this is true, spreading democracy can be construed as a national security issue: it is in our self interest. If not, the claim that the US actions in foreign nations are purely for economic profit (blood-for-oil argumentation) gain significant credibility.

Actually, both are true. Polarizing motivation into only this or that sanitizes any analysis to the point of bleached underwear, it ends up white, or something else.

In that period, Britain fought more wars than just about any other country.

Any expanding country, democracy or not, will likely have more conflicts than a sedentary one. If you are going to trot out arguments like this again, please provide comprehensive long-term statistics to back up your anecdotal assertions.

a large portion of military training consists of preparing individual soldiers to face such challenges with enthusiasm, or if you'd like it put more cynically, to bear these costs without thinking too hard.

As for officers, wars make their careers. Of course they would support one. That fact does nothing for you.

You must be talking of a different country’s military, one other than the one I served in. Even today, you still hear that kind of nonsense that being in the military somehow automatically correlates with a willingness, even a preference for violence. Spend some time in the trenches dude, and you’ll hear something entirely different. American soldiers, enlisted and commissioned alike, overwhelming serve to protect our country. And during WWII, one of the advantages GIJoes had over other soldiers was their ability to think for themselves; command was effective all the way down to the junior non-coms.

You watch too many Hollywood movies portraying our good men and woman as psychopaths making love to a razor-sharp, gleaming blade of some wicked looking knife. Training for aggressive, lethal behavior is not the same as enthusiasm.

I think it makes perfect sense for soldiers to support any war they are fighting in at the time, for the reasons outlined above.

Of course we support the war we are sent to fight, but not for the blood-thirsty reasons you give. Rather, war is lethal; do it in half-measures and you’ll likely end up dead.

A hypernationalistic China could be a danger even if democratic. A democratic, yet nationalist India is eager to establish a world role befitting its population size and that could well lead to tensions with other democracies.

Amen.

You know, if I apply the same kind of logic that I am reading thus far, I could make a very simple provable assertion that non-democratic nations are more warlike and less altruistic than democracies. Here goes. Nazi Germany signed peace and non-aggression treaties with Britain and Russia and promptly broke the letter and spirit of those agreements. WWI was started by a disagreement between a radicalist and a monarchist, and it took a fledgling world democracy (America) to put an end to it, not to mention the fact that two out of the three Allied countries (Britain and France were democracies) and those on the other side were either monarchies or fledgling statist countries.

Besides, what proportion of Islamic terrorists come from democratic countries?

Anecdotal evidence is soooo easy.

Anyway, Judge Posner’s last sentence says it all.

Nevertheless if they were genuinely democrat they would probably find it difficult to rally their people to support a militaristic foreign policy, or to support terrorist movements that might provoke a violent response from the United States.

The operative word is “probably”.

The point of the Judge’s post was that freedom is more likely to come from countries that sport economic freedom first, rather than political freedom.

"I didn't change the argument, Palooka, I slowed it down. But now we are on the same page with it, more or less."

Yes, you did. Before you said my argument required citizens of undemocratic countries to be naturally less just. Now you are simply quibbling with whether moral considerations can always stop war.

"I disagree with you that citizens are constitutionally more averse to blood than your typical non-democratic rulers."

One wonders why you claim to be supportive of democratic movements if they are as morally bankrupt and prone to abuse as the average dictatorship.

"Your moral defense of wars against non-democratic countries is rather a jumble. When those wars cause more harm than good, and when they are motivated for material benefit, how can they be called moral? You must concede that at least some wars against non-democratic nations are immoral, maybe even more so than some wars against democracies. Do the dead spring to life because you call a dictator illegitimate?"

Nothing is jumbled, and I am not defending anything. I am pointing out that being a democracy makes it less likely you will war with others, especially another democracy. I have stated some of the reasons I think this is true. One of those reasons is that the citizenry is bound to believe, ceteris paribus, warring against another democracy presents greater moral questions than warring against a dictatorship (which is likely to lack popular support of its people and an acceptable human rights record).

Putting aside whatever your feelings on the Iraq War may be, don't you think the recent elections are a good thing? If you say yes, then I think you're conceding that the moral calculus I have described is real. How powerful it is remains an open question.

"In that period, Britain fought more wars than just about any other country."

Any expanding country, democracy or not, will likely have more conflicts than a sedentary one.

Well, duh. That was just the point. Some democracies are likely to be aggressively expansionist, others are not. The most aggresively expansionist country in the world for nearly 200 years was Britain, also the founder of modern Parliamentary democracy. Historically, there has not necesarily been a correlation between democracy and not being expansionist.

If you are going to trot out arguments like this again, please provide comprehensive long-term statistics to back up your anecdotal assertions.

Ah, the traditional desperation counter-argument "Its anecdotal, not statistical", while not providing any statistical evidence of your own. There are not that many long-term democracies. The 2 longest term are the United States and Britain and certainly both had an aggressive expansionist program in the 19th century and early 20th century at least. To be fair, both countries developed any territories reasonably well, but altriusm was not a motiation. To be even more fair, one counter-example that comes to mind is the Federalist Republic of Switzerland -- not as long-term a democracy as the other 2, but still a non-expansionist nation.

Besides, what proportion of Islamic terrorists come from democratic countries?

I don't know if an exact proportion could be done easily, but we know that Islamic terrorists have come from democratic India, Russia, Turkey and Indonesia. Established democracies England and Germany had terror cells in their midst.Terrorists have also come from fledgling democracy Morocco and on-and-off democracy Pakistan. They have also come from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank -- places that have had occasional democratic elections but are still very much works-in-progress.

On the other side, Islamic terrorists come from dictatorial Saudi Arabia and Egypt and (less commonly) from Syria.

If one looks at all terrorists (not just Islamist terror), many democracies have internal terror groups. The IRA in Great Britain, Basque groups in Spain, the likes of Timothy McVeign in the US, a dozen separatist and terror groups in India etc.

It is definitely true that democracies provide a whole host of tools to deal with fringe groups that should help to stop the extreme step of terrorism. Yet no democracy can accomodate all such fringe groups: Mc Veigh in the US, Baader Meinhof in Germany etc. Equally, simply being a democracy is not enough to get rid of ancient hates (IRA in Britain). Newer democracies such as India are more likely to have terror movements as well. India has many terror movements operating in the country from Kashmiri separatists, Maoist Rebels, Tribal groups, Christian separatists, caste arimes.

Yes, Palooka, your arguments require that citizens in a democracy (those who control decision making, more or less) refrain from wars where those in control of other governments would not. These are wars that would be in those citizens' short term pecuniary interest. That requires them to be more just -- more just than we normally expect human beings to be. Yes, it is silly. But that is what your argument requires.

You expect the public in a democracy to refrain its government from entering into wars for moral reasons. I think history bears out that where the decision-makers stand to gain from a war, they will enter into it, regardless of moral equivocations. Then they will justify it, somehow. This is true when the decision-makers are a few oligarchs, and it is true when, more or less, a majority has its say. You admit that oligarchs aren't likely to be swayed by these moral arguments. Why should a democratic electorate, if not that you think the electorate is morally superior to the other decision-makers?

Your moral jumble is this: that wars against democracies are necessarily more morally problematic than wars against differently organized countries. That statement cannot hold up under scrutiny. There are much more important considerations than the type of government one is opposing, such as: whether the war is offensive or defensive, whether the war targets civilians, whether the war involves subjugating the vanquished country's citizens.

Not only are there more important considerations, but the fact that one is opposing an unelected government is no moral consideration at all. The form of government alone cannot justify the amount of harm that a war inflicts upon the country where it takes place. Wide-spread human rights may justify an invasion -- if that is the true motivating factor for invasion -- but form of government in of itself does not necessitate human rights violations.

You cite this argument -- that wars against non-democracies are more justified than wars against democracies -- as an example of a moral platitude we can expect democratic citizens to exercise in refraining from unjust wars. Yet it is merely an easy justification that the public has thrown around in support of the present war. It is a prime example of the easy, self-satisfied way that people -- all people: oligarchs, citizens, elks club members, local school board chiefs -- bend moral arguments in whichever direction that supports their own self-interest. There is no reason we should expect differently from a democratic populace than from an aristocratic government. People support wars that they expect to benefit from, especially if they don't have to pay the costs.

Yes -- Palooka, elections in Iraq are good, but not because whatever government they produce, if they can produce one without a civil war, is unlikely to wage war against other democracies. Elections are good because, if they produce a democratic government, that will be of benefit to Iraqis. I do not really support the divine right of kings. Democracies are good. However, that form of government in of itself does not entail a more peaceful nation. It could go otherwise, and has before.

Does the fact of elections justify our invasion? No, it does not in my mind.

I will continue to correct you when you misstate my arguments, no matter how repetitive it becomes.

Palooka --

If you think that a democratic populace is more likely to refrain from wars that stand in their pecuniary interests than an oligarchic government, fine. That is what you think. My question is: why?

What is it about a democracy that makes its citizens more susceptible to moral arguments than those who make the decisions in other types of governments?

Please refrain from misstating my arguments and answer this question. I am genuinely curious.

R, it looks like you misunderstand Palooka's point a bit. First, he is saying that democratic governments are significantly more likely to internalize the costs to the population of inefficient wars in the decision-making process than a dictator. That much seems hardly controversial.

Second, he seems to be saying that open societies and democratic processes are less likely to foment megalomania that is so often characteristic of dictatorships. Before hauling out old Hitler, I think it's fair to say that Germany was not a democracy soon after 1933. Hitler won on a fairly vague agenda of restoring German greatness, something that hardly leads to global war per se, and some old fashioned xenophobia to stoke the population. Then, he seized power and the rest is history.

Democracies are more likely, through deliberation, to temper such megalomania. Not that they are immune from such, just that they are more likely to produce solid thinking through debate, both inside and outside the halls of government.

RWS -- as to the point about internalizing costs, Palooka is not saying that. In fact, I think it is somewhat contraversial (that democracies' internalization of costs prevents wars). I have posted about that above. Palooka has not refuted the arguments I made about internalization of costs. They may be open to refutation, but he has not refuted them -- instead Palooka seized on one word that I have used -- "just," either in confusion, or on purpose, and in so doing avoided addressing my actual arguments.

Perhaps you would like to address the arguments about internalization of war costs leading to peace brokerage. I think, in many instances, that democratic majorities don't adequately internalize the costs of war. Often it is a minority of citizens that fight. Usually they come from the lower end of the economic spectrum, and although I don't claim that they (the soldiers and potential soldiers) have no voice in a democracy, it is a lesser voice than those who contribute to and run in political campaigns.

In the present war, at least, a majority of the population is not internalizing the costs. Neither the cost of actually having to fight, nor the cost of funding, which we are putting off for now. This is just a sketch; see above for more if you desire.

The megalomania point is interesting, but I don't think that by itself it proves the assertion that democracies are less likely to start wars (against democracies, or anybody) than all other types of governments. I might concede that fascist governments such as you describe are the most war-like form of government of all; but we can hardly say that all non-democratic governments are fascist.

R, you've changed your argument once again. At least now it makes sense.

First you said:

"You seem to think that citizens in a democracy would restrain themselves from unjust wars against other democracies, even when they stand to profit from those wars, and won't pay any costs. Why would that be, Palooka, unless they were more naturally just?"

Now you're saying:

"Yes, Palooka, your arguments require that citizens in a democracy (those who control decision making, more or less) refrain from wars where those in control of other governments would not."

Your recent statement is an accurate reflection of my belief that democracies are more likely to refrain from "unjust" wars or just wars generally. But your first argument says that I believe the CITIZENS of democracies are "naturally more just" than citizens of other, undemocratic countries. Because citizens do not control undemocratic