May 14, 2006
Are CEOS Overpaid? BECKER
The answer to the question of whether American CEOS are overpaid is clearly "yes" for those who earn large bonuses and generous stock options when their companies are doing badly, either absolutely or relative to competitors. Business Week has had an annual list of the most overpaid CEOS relative to the performance of the companies they head. A number of well-known companies usually top that list.
But the concern in the media and in Congress over CEO pay is not motivated by some bad apples like these, but by the huge increase in the typical CEO pay in the US during the past 25 years. The total real compensation (that is, compensation adjusted for increases in the price level) of CEOS in larger publicly traded companies during this period grew a remarkable six fold, where compensation adds together regular pay, bonuses, stocks awarded, the value of stock options, and payouts from longer term pay programs. A big but not the only component of the increase is due to much greater use of stock options. Since median fulltime real earnings during the same period only just about doubled, the gap between pay at the top and the average pay of employees widened enormously. It is hard to resist the widespread perception from these trends that CEOS and other top executives are being increasingly overpaid.
The case against the pay of American CEOS looks even more powerful by recognizing that the typical American company head receives greater total compensation than company heads in Great Britain, Canada, Japan, Spain, and in pretty much all developed countries. Clearly, American CEOS are much better paid than CEOS elsewhere, even when per capita incomes of the countries do not differ by very much.
Yet competition for top management can explain the rapid rise over time in the pay of the average American CEO. To understand how competition works in the management market, consider the strong and stable relation at any moment between the total compensation of CEOS at publicly traded companies, and the size of the companies they head. For every 10 per cent increase in firm size, measured by the market value of assets, by sales, or by related variables, compensation increases by about 3 per cent. This "30 per cent" law held during the 1930's, and has held for every succeeding decade, including right up to the present. Note that stock options and other forms of compensation than salaries and bonuses were unimportant until the 1970's, so this relation is not due to the rapid growth of options and compensation through shares of stock.
The usual explanation given by economists for the positive relation between compensation and firm size is that the largest companies attract the best management. Therefore, bigger companies have to pay their CEOS better in order to discourage them from going to head smaller companies. It is also socially efficient to have the best mangers run the largest companies because their greater skills then have a bigger influence since they would manage a larger amount of labor and capital. The efficient combining of better managers with larger companies in a competitive market for top managers would imply a positive relation between firm size and the total compensation package. This analysis does not explain why the 30 per cent rule holds, but it suggests that the relation between pay and size is likely to be sizable, even when top management in different sized companies do not differ greatly in skills and abilities.
We need two additional facts to explain the sharp rise in pay over time, and the much higher pay in the United States than other countries. The first is that the average size of large American companies has grown in real terms about six fold during the past twenty-five years, regardless of how "large" is measured, as long as the same measure is used consistently over time. The other important fact is that the largest 50, 100, or 500 American publicly traded companies are much bigger than the largest companies in other countries.
Clearly, if large companies pay more, and if the average size of companies has grown sharply over time, average compensation would also grow, even if the value of the increasingly generous granting of stock options and equity shares were fully understood by stock markets and boards of directors. It is also possible to understand why average compensation grew about as rapidly as average company size, although the argument here is more complicated (for the details of this argument, see Xavier Gabaix (MIT) and Augustin Landier (NYU), "Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?" unpublished, April 17, 2006). The allocation of better managers to larger firms, and competition for these managers among companies of different sizes, means that companies in say 2006 would have to pay more for their CEOS than even the same sized companies did in 1980, although much less than six times as much. The reasoning is that the 2006 companies of a given size are competing against relatively larger companies than comparable size companies did in 1980. Using this analysis, Gabaix and Landier are able to explain why total compensation of the average CEO of larger companies grew about six fold along with the six-fold growth in average company size during the past several decades.
The same argument explains why compensation of American CEOS is much higher than that of CEOS in other countries. Since average firm size is much lower elsewhere, their pay would be more like that of pay in the US in 1980 or 1990 than the pay of CEOS in today's much larger American firms. As the market for top executives becomes increasingly global, the pay of CEOS in other countries would rise, and that of CEOS in America might fall. For example, to attract Carlos Ghosn, a Brazilian working in France, to turn around Nissan, a seriously ailing company, Nissan had to pay him not at the low Japanese CEO levels, but at the much higher levels found in other countries.
I believe that the explanation based on the allocation of CEO talent largely is behind the explosion in compensation of American CEOS during the past several decades. Yet at the same time, some American CEOS are obviously grossly overpaid since they have mismanaged their companies, and still receive exorbitant compensations. But mismanagement is not new and probably has not become so much more important over time. So I am suggesting that the rapid growth of compensation of American CEOS, and its premium over compensation of CEOS in other countries, is not mainly due to a growth in the degree of excess payment of executives in the United States. Rather, on this interpretation, the main cause of the increase in pay is the greater challenges and opportunities facing executives who manage much larger combinations of resources.
Posted by Gary Becker at 9:13 PM | Comments (20) | TrackBack (1)
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Comments
"The usual explanation given by economists for the positive relation between compensation and firm size is that the largest companies attract the best management. Therefore, bigger companies have to pay their CEOS better in order to discourage them from going to head smaller companies."
If larger companies *attract* the best management, then why would you need a compensation incentive to retain the most talented CEOs? It would seem to me, if you have to pay CEOs more to keep them from going to smaller companies, either *smaller* companies are attracting the best management, or conversely, you're paying mediocre CEOs more to keep smaller companies from getting them.
I have no experience with management in a large (Fortune 500 sized) company; but could it be that the idea of "attracting the best" is really just a notion to bolster what are, actually, averagely talented executives? It would seem when an organization reaches a certain size, the collective knowledge of upper management and the organizational knowledge would be more valuable than the leadership of one single individual. But in order to convince the company (and perhaps public) that the CEO does matter that much, their compensation is inflated in effect to boost their perceived value to the public and the employees.
What are your thoughts on tying CEO compensation exclusively to the performance of the company?
Posted by Anonymous at May 14, 2006 10:04 PM | direct link
Before reaching a robust conclusion on whether CEOs of public firms are overpaid or not, a study that matches compensation of CEOs of public and private firms of similar size in the U.S. is needed. Chicago, USC and Harvard folks probably know some HR firms that could help provide such proprietary data.
Posted by Arun Khanna at May 14, 2006 10:59 PM | direct link
Just to clarify for the first poster: companies "attract" talent with money. In general, potential CEOs are presumed to be indifferent between the size of company and will choose jobs based on pay. Thus, large companies, if they want to get the best talent, have to pay more, and they do so because they have more resources and more at stake than smaller firms.
Posted by Haris at May 15, 2006 8:11 AM | direct link
Why would a CEO be indifferent to the size of the company? If different sized companies present different challenges, environments, etc. is it really accurate to say that the only "attracting" factor to talented CEOs is money?
Posted by Anonymous at May 15, 2006 11:36 AM | direct link
is it really accurate to say that the only "attracting" factor to talented CEOs is money?
Of course not. That's not what I was saying. CEOs, like all other people, weigh many things when they pick jobs, including prestige, time required, industry, location, and various other qualities. However, those are specific to individual persons and are presumed to cancel out in the population of CEOs that is out there. It is in this way similar to luck, which is presumed to cancel out so that average luck is 0 while individuals have varying experiences. CEO preferences for large/small, established/start-up, northern/southern/western, and other aspects of the job thus likely cancel out and are zero on average, too. This is an assumption of the economic model, and while not exactly true it is approximately true.
This leaves money as the only measurable proxy of what CEOs prefer, and like everyone else, they are presumed to want more money rather than less. Now, while some people will take less money to lead a firm they love rather than more to lead one they hate, on average they will simply follow the money.
Posted by Haris at May 15, 2006 12:24 PM | direct link
The trouble with this analysis is that it assumes that CEO talent is rare and measurable. In other words, that there are only a few people capable of managing large firms, and that it is possible to distinguish them from close contenders. I don't believe that.
I don't claim that there are millions of people who can do it, but I'd guess there are thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of experienced executives who can run an S&P500 firm, and that there would be little different in the way of results. So why the need to pay absurd sums?
Besides, Becker admits that there are very poorly run firms with seriously overpaid CEO's. To simply dismiss this as "mismanagement happens" is to neglect important evidence that just does not fit one's preferred hypothesis. The existence of these firms shows that there are factors that can lead to serious overcompensation. Why can't the same factors be at work in determining the compensation of CEO's of better-performing firms?
It is interesting that shareholders have, in fact, virtually no control over executive compensation (or the makeup of the board), and efforts to give them control are fiercely resisted by business types (who love to proclaim the glories of the market). Why is that, I suppose?
Posted by Bernard Yomtov at May 15, 2006 12:51 PM | direct link
Are divisions of US firms also bigger than their international peers? If so, I would expect, according to Professor Becker's theory, that US managers below the CEO level would also be more highly compensated than their international peers. Anyone have data on this?
Posted by Scot at May 15, 2006 8:12 PM | direct link
To me the evidence that there is significant cronyism and self-dealing involved in CEO compensation, is that even the worst CEO's, the ones who run compnaies into the ground, get huge golden parachutes.
If it was a fair system, the CEO of Time Warner who bought AOL, or any other disasterous failure would be dismissed out of hand, and told "sue us". After all, he was already paid tens of millions while employed.
Why give him a big retirement package?
Posted by Arthur Gandolfi at May 16, 2006 2:56 PM | direct link
As far as I can see, no one has addressed the fact that the agency problems with management compensation are a cost of the huge amount of liquidity provided in the US markets. Instead of complaining to the board, shareholders sell out and move on.
Also, as a college student, I can tell you that most Ivy Leaguers these days could care less about being the CEO of a Fortune 500 company. They would rather work for a private equity firm, consulting firm, investment bank, or hedge fund. The work is stimulating (everything is relative) and compensation is closely tied to results.
Posted by Paul at May 16, 2006 7:22 PM | direct link
"If it was a fair system, the CEO of Time Warner who bought AOL, or any other disasterous failure would be dismissed out of hand, and told "sue us". After all, he was already paid tens of millions while employed."
I can only assume that a CEO's compensation package is written less like an average white collar worker and more like a star athelete. No player is forced to take lower pay or dismissed with no pay when he does not live up to expectations.
Posted by Undergrad at May 16, 2006 8:07 PM | direct link
In my humble opinion, CEOs ARE overpaid.
Posted by Nina Krause at May 17, 2006 6:04 AM | direct link
I think that Becker is an expert in labor economics and would trust his judgement and his research.
There are many measures of compensation including benefits, options, and salary.
I think the highest paid individual is a person who starts their own company. This was true of the google founders and founders of microsoft.
After that, managers of private equity groups and investors are paid a great deal.
I am not really into counting anyone elses money. I believe that at the end of my life I will probably be paid too much and won't need the money.
At the end of a person's life, we don't ask, "How much were they paid?"
Now at HP Carly was definetly over paid, but Henry
Ford never was,
Gary
Posted by garygech at May 17, 2006 11:51 AM | direct link
I think we can all agree that all this money being wasted on CEOs ought to be transferred to lawyers.
Posted by SnakesOnAPlane at May 18, 2006 3:19 AM | direct link
One reason that CEO's seem to receive so much compensation is because our reporting systems and tax system persist in classifying profits made upon exercise of options as compensation, when it might be more consistent with the popular notion of compensation to treat the option grants themselves as the compensation, valuing and taxing them when awarded.
Posted by Mark T at May 18, 2006 9:57 AM | direct link
New Booze Allen report shows that Global CEO Turnover set new record in 2005. Lots of interesting findings in the report.
http://www.boozallen.com/home/about/article_news-ideas/3744370?lpid=66005
Posted by Pablo H. at May 18, 2006 1:23 PM | direct link
The usual explanation given by economists for the positive relation between compensation and firm size is that the largest companies attract the best management. Therefore, bigger companies have to pay their CEOS better
So large companies pay their top management more money because their managers are better than most.
[T]he relation between pay and (company) size is likely to be sizable, even when top management in different sized companies do not differ greatly in skills and abilities.
So large companies pay more just because they pay more, and there's no direct link to skill?
I am quite obviously missing something basic here, and I wonder if anyone would be kind enough to explain it to me.
Posted by Samantha Joy at May 18, 2006 1:59 PM | direct link
Samantha
That's a good point, I hadn't noticed the apparent contradiction there until you pointed it out. I think the point is that there are two reasons that pay at bigger firms is higher than at lower ones. The first is, as you point out, that bigger firms want the best talent and therefore have to pay more. The second is that management at bigger firms has a bigger social impact because they manage more capital and labor, so that even if management at a bigger firm is no more talented than elsewhere, they will make more money, both as a reflection of their social impact as well as a means of attracting better managers to such positions. That's my take, at least.
Posted by Haris at May 18, 2006 2:38 PM | direct link
Mr. Goshn is not a great CEO. Nissan made great products but did not turn a profit. Mr. Goshn cuts costs, increases profits and lives off products that were in the pipeline. It is an old trick to make a company, or CEO, look good. Time will tell if he can continue to build Nissan, but I have my doubts.
CEOs at GM and Ford may be better then Goshn but they must deal with the problems that they inherited. GM's CEO can cut cost by 50%, but he must still deal with a product that many people do not want.
My point is that CEOs are too often rewarded or punished based on things they have little control over.
The larger the company the less impact that the CEO has on the company. So why should compensation go up as real impact goes down?
The larger the company, the more important the management team. And the larger the pool of talent on the team, the more the CEO is an important but replaceable part. As one person has less impact on the overall success, why should compensation escalate?
Or is the US a tournament that promise rewards to junior executives, a chance at a winning lottery ticket. The very best may not rise to the top, but junior staff increases efforts because it gives them an increased chance at outsized rewards.
Or to at least have a member of their team win, and give them the perks of winning. Feudal Lords backing a King who helps them, even if the King is rewarded - like a King.
The truth may be that the larger the company the more trivial the cost of a CEO. If you overpay, who really cares enough to take action? If the company is doing well you shrug it off. If the company is doing badly, you blame everyone.
Posted by Dan C at May 20, 2006 6:09 AM | direct link
Good, thank you, wonderful
بنت مكه
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